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I. INTRODUCTION 
For almost a generation, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
operated under a socialist legal system unique among its fellow 
Communist countries, with neither a criminal code, a criminal pro-
cedure code, or lawyers. Judges were not required to have had legal 
training, nor were they required or expected to cite legal provisions 
in rendering judgments. For a considerable time, this ''unique legal 
system" had greatly impressed some Western visitors. One Ameri-
can judge, for example, after visiting the PRC in 1975, expressed the 
view that "in this new society [of the PRC] ... serious crime is a 
rarity, juvenile delinquency nearly nonexistent and lawyers virtually 
unnecessary .... Jails are few and their populations small. The 
trappings of a restrictive regime are absent . . . . Maoist socialism 
has produced a new society .... " 1 An American law professor ex-
pressed a similar view after a visit in 1977 by writing that "[f]ull 
• Professor of Law, University of Maryland, School of Law, Baltimore, Maryland. 
l. George W. Croketeet, Jr., "Criminal Justice in China," Judicature, Vol. 59, No. S 
(December 1975), p. 247. · 
(1) 
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employment and a fairly uniform standard of living reduce the moti-
vation for crime .... "2 
Then, unexpectedly, beginning in 1978, virtually all the Chinese 
media, from official newspapers and publications to wall posters, the 
underground press and other sources, burst out with numerous re-
ports relating angry complaints of arbitrary imprisonment or execu-
tion carried out under official authority. These publications set forth 
the people's demands for human rights, democracy, and other legal 
rights and protections. Since that time barely a day has passed with-
out a report in an official publication of the reversal of a verdict 
against an innocent person who had been convicted and imprisoned 
or executed before 1977. The ·~new society'' described by the above-
mentioned two American visitors was labeled by an official PRC 
English-language publication as "feudal depotism married to 20th-
century fascism."3 The PRC authorities frankly acknowledged that 
China's legal system was manifestly imperfect and badly in need of 
reform. The Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (December 18 
and 22, 1978) set the goals of China's legal reform as follows: 
In order to safeguard people's democracy, it is imperative 
to strengthen the socialist legal system so that democracy is 
systematized and written into law in such a way as to en-
sure the stability, continuity and full authority of this dem-
ocratic system and these laws; there must be laws for 
people to follow, these laws must be observed, their en-
forcement must be strict and law breakers must be dealt 
with. From now on, legislative work should have an im-
portant place on the agenda of the National People's Con-
gress and its Standing Committee. Procuratorial and 
judicial organizations must maintain their independence as 
is appropriate; they must faithfully abide by the laws, rule 
and regulations, serve the people's interests, keep to the 
facts; guarantee the equality of all people before the peo-
ple's laws and deny anyone the privilege of being above the 
law.4 
With surprising speed, the PRC enacted several important laws 
2. Derrick Bell. "Inside China: Continuity and Social Reform, "Juris Doctor, Vol. 
8, No. 4 (April 1978), p. 26. 
3. "Prospect and Retrospect, China's Socialist Legal System," Beijing Review, Vol. 
22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 27. 
4. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (October-December 1978)," The ClriPio 
Quarterly, No. 77 (March 1979), p. 172. 
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in 1979, including an Arrest and Detention Law,5 a Criminal Law, a 
Criminal Procedure Law, an Organic Law of the People's Court and 
an Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates.6 Immediately after 
the promulgation of these laws, a national publici!_( campaign was 
begun to make the laws known to all the people. Every leading 
daily in the country has published the full texts of these laws, to-
gether with explanatory articles and commentaries. Some papers 
have published special columns answering questions concerning the 
laws and explaining legal terms. Legal ~riodicals, which ceased to 
publish in 1966, began to appear again. Several popular and easy-
to-understand books on law were published.9 Never before in the 
30-year history of the PRC had law and the legal system so widely 
interested the general public and the government. This paper ana-
lyzes and discusses the present state of PRC legal reform, the direc-
tion which that reform is likely to take, and the extent to which PRC 
legal practice is likely to retain its pre-1979 features. 
To understand the recent legal reform and its limits, one must 
appreciate how the legal system operated before 1979. Accordingly, 
this analysis begins with an overview of the Chinese legal system in 
the pre-1979 period. 
II. THE LEGAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1979 AND THE NEED 
FOR REFORM 
The Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Cen-
tral Committee of the Communist Party (December 18 and 22, 1978) 
sets forth the contents of the proposed law reform in sixteen Chinese 
characters-Youfa keyi, Youfa biyi, Zhifa biyan, Weifa bijiu (there 
must be laws for people to follow, these laws must be observed, their 
enforcement must be strict, and law breakers must be dealt with). 10 
5. "Regulations for Arrest and Detention," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 10 (March 
9, 1979), p. 4. Complete text released by New China New agency on February 24, 1979. 
6. See Peng Zhen, "Explanation on Seven Laws," Beijing Review, Vol. 22 No. 29 
(July 20, 1979), pp. 8-16. 
7. See "Publicizing the New Laws," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 29 (July 20, 1979), 
pp. 3-4. 
8. E.g., Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in law), Minzltu yu Fazlti (Democracy and legal sys-
tem), Renmin Gongan (People's public security), Renmin Jianclta (People's 
procuratorate), Rmmin S!fa (People's judiciary), and Fazlti Bao (Legal system daily). 
9. E.g., Chen Qunlong et al., Falu zlti.rlti wmda (Questions and answers on law), 
Beijing: Beijing chupanshe, 1979, and Zhang Youyu and Wang Shuwen, Falujihen zltislti 
jianglrua (talks on basic knowledge of law). Beijing: Zhong guo qingnienchubanshe, 
1980. 
10. See note 4, supra. 
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These sixteen character words also concisely expressed some basic 
problems of China's legal system before 1979 which are discussed 
one by one below. 
1. There Must be Law for People to Follow. 
Before the formal inauguration of the PRC on October 1, 1949, 
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference adopted the 
Common Program 11 which served as a provisional constitution until 
the adoption of a formal constitution on September 20, 1954. The 
Common Program abolished all former Republic of China (Nation-
alist) laws, 12 but the PRC did not itself enact substantive and proce-
dural civil and criminal laws to replace those it had abolished. The 
only important criminal legislation enacted before the effective date 
of the present Criminal Law, January 1, 1980, was the Act for the 
Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries of the PRC, promulgated on 
February 21, 195l.U Two articles of the latter Act deserve special 
attention. First, Article 18 made the Act retroactive to cover "pre-
liberation" activities, i.e., acts committed before the establishment of 
the PRC in 1949. 14 Second, Article 16 set forth the principle of 
crime by analogy: 
Persons who have committed other crimes with counterrev-
olutionary intent that are not specified in the law shall be 
punished according to analogous specified crimes in the 
Act. 15 
The lack of a comprehensive criminal code and detailed statutes 
did not hamper the work of the people's courts since they were fre-
quently instructed to follow orders or policies of the government or 
the party in cases not covered by existing laws. 16 
11. For an English translation of the Common Program. see Yuan-li Wu, ed., China: 
A Hantlhook, New York: Praeger, 1973, pp. 789-98. 
12. Article 17 of the Common Program. 
13. For an English translation of the Act, see Jerome Alan Cohen, The Criminal Pro-
cess In the People's Repuhlic oj China, 1949-1961, An Introducdon, Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1968, pp. 299-302. 
14. Ibili., p. 302. 
15. Ibid 
16. E.g., Article 4 of the 1951 Provisional Organic Regulations of the People's Courts 
in the PRC. See Shao-chuan Leng, Justice In Communist China, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: 
Oceana, 1967, p. 32. In an interview conducted by a German correspondent with some 
Chinese officials in 1974, the Chinese acknowledged that "the principles on which the 
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In judicial practice, the people's courts usually did not indicate 
the particular law or provisions according to which a given judgment 
was rendered. Generally, a judgment did not indicate to the accused 
what provision of law he or she was convicted ofviolating,17 and, in 
fact, the court was not even required to give a copy of the judgment 
to him or her. 18 Other procedural safeguards that were lacking in-
cluded a statutory time limit on detention of an accused. 19 
Needless to say, the flexibility of the system necessarily led to 
governmental and party abuse of judicial power, which resulted in 
persecution of the people, including loyal communist party mem-
bers. First, the cadres created multifarious and inconsistent "local 
laws" and "local policies" in different parts of the country under the 
guise of implementing party policies for the administration of justice 
and maintenance of the social order.20 
Second, because crimes and offenses lacked reasonably precise 
definitions in law and policy, individuals were in many instances 
subjected to severe punishment without knowing what actions they 
had taken that constituted a punishable offense. For instance, in 
1968 an old woman was sentenced to death and executed because 
she had served as a matchmaker in arranging the marriages of three 
female youths who happened to have been on the list of persons to 
be sent to the rural area for settlement. The charge was that, by 
arranging such marriages, she had undermined the party policy of 
sending educated youth to settle in rural areas (Xiafan).21 Recent 
PRC publications have revealed that in many places, "an official's 
will is the law''22 because he alone can define what is legal and illegal 
before or after an act is committed. 
Third, there were some laws which so vaguely and flexibly de-
fined offenses as to be virtually no law at all. For instance, in Janu-
court's work are based are Party policy and the law of the state." See Gerd Ruge, "An 
Interview with Chinese Legal Officials," Tire China Quarterly, No. 61 (March 1975), p. 
118. 
17. See, e.g., the translation of several court notices in Hungdah Chiu, "Criminal 
Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents," Jour-
nal of Criminal Law cf Criminology, VoL 66, No. 3 (1977), pp. 392-398. 
18. See Sheng Zhuhong, "Human Rights and Legal System," Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1979, 
No.2, p. 20. 
19. See Amnesty International Repon, Political Imprisonment in the People's Republic 
of China, London, 1978, p. 49. 
20. Chen Qunlong et al., supra note 9, p. 26. 
21. Wang Ruowang, "Jokes Should Not Be Considered as 'Law'," Minzhu yu Fazhi, 
1980, No. 1, pp. 25-26. 
22. See, e.g. , Zheng Liwen, "Practice is the Only Criterion for Evaluating Legal The-
ory," Faxue Yanjiu, 1978 Preliminary Issue, p. 23. 
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ary 1967, the State Council issued a decree which is usually referred 
to as the "Six Articles on Public Security." This decree, inter alia, 
defined "malicious attack" on leaders as "current counterrevolution-
ary activities" punishable "according to law." Many people were se-
verely punished or imprisoned under this decree for such gossip as 
that Lin Biao was not well-built or that Jiang Qing was not the first 
wife of Mao; others were punished merely for shouting a wrong 
slogan.23 
Fourth, because the definitions of criminal offenses did not in-
clude an element of mens rea (criminal intent), many unintentional 
or accidental acts were severely punished, for example, in the so-
called "damaging precious [Mao's] picture" cases.24 Regardless of 
the actor's intention, anyone who even accidentally or unintention-
ally broke or damaged Mao's picture was severely punished. In one 
case, a cadre who used a newspaper to wrap an article and acciden-
tally broke the paper which contained Mao's picture was sentenced 
to 8 years imprisonment on a charge of engaging in counterrevolu-
tionary activity.25 In another case, a 19 year-old youth was sen-
tenced to 18 years imprisonment on a charge of "malicious attack" 
on the "Great Leader'' because he placed three crickets on the table 
of one of his fellow workers for fun but behind that table there hap-
pened to be a picture of Mao. 26 
Fifth, the lack of applicable law also caused serious problems in 
settling disputes27 among state enterprises, which resulted in the dis-
ruption of production quotas. 
2. The Law Must be Observed. 
Even if there is a law governing a particular matter, it can be 
23. Yu Haocheng, "The 'Offense of Malicious Attack' and 'Six Articles of Public 
Security'," Minzku yu Fazlti, 1919, No. 1, p. 36. a Nanjing worker got five years impris-
onment merely because he inadvertently commented in public on Lin Biao's build. 
"Prospect and Retrospect, China's Socialist Legal System," supra note 3, p. 27. This type 
of punishment existed even before the Cultural Revolution. In 1958, a twelve-year-old 
youth was sentenced to five years imprisonment for allegedly shouting wrong slogans in a 
parado-"Oppose World Peace" and ''Oppose U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon." Liu 
Rong, "Am I a Counterrevolutionary?" Minzltu yu Fazlti, 1919, No.2, p. 39. 
24. Wei Kemin, "Be Cautious! Be Cautious!" Minzltu yu Fazhi, 1980, No. 11, p. 27. 
25. Tao Xijjin, "Problems in the Study of Criminal Law," Faxue Yanjiu, 1979, No.5, 
~~ . 
26. Ma Jian, "Three Crickets and Eighteen Years Imprisonment," Minzltuyu Fazhi, 
1980, No. 10, p. 38. 
27. See Yang Zixuan, Tian Jianhua and Kou Mengliang, "Report on the Enlarge-
ment of the Power of Decision of Enterprises and the Strengthening of Economic Legis-
lation," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 2, p. 57. 
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totally disregarded or overruled by a Party policy. There are too 
many examples of this process to cite them all. The most notorious 
case involved the removal of Liu Shao-ch'i from his position as the 
Chairman of the People's Republic of China by a decision of the 
Communist Party of China. Article 28 of the 1954 Constitution, 
which provides for the removal of the Chairman by the National 
People's Congress, was totally disregarded. Before his removal, Liu 
was arrested in total disregard of Article 89 of the 1954 Constitution 
which provided that "no citizen may be arrested except by decision 
of a people's court or with the approval of a people's procuracy" and 
of Article I of the 1954 Arrest and Detention Act.28 Later, Liu was 
abused to death without any legal procedure. 
During mass movements or campaigns, legal procedures were 
often totally disregarded and ad hoc organs were set up to arrest, 
investigate and detain alleged offenders for unlimited periods.29 
Even a clear provision of law on a given subject can be repealed 
by Party policy. For instance, the 1950 Marriage Law specifically 
provided that the minimum marriage ages for males and females 
were, respectively, 20 and 18 years. Later, the Party decided to raise 
those ages to 28 years for males and 26 for females, in total disregard 
ofthe widely publicized 1950 Marriage Law.30 
3. Law E'!forcement Must Be Strict and Law Breakers Must 
Be Dealt With. 
In the PRC, the enforcement of law depends upon three extra-
legal factors: 
(i) Whether the accused or the victim belongs to the 
five categories of elements-former landlords, former rich 
peasants, counterrevolutionaries, rightists and bad ele-
ments. A person in one of the five categories, or a descen-
dant of such a person, would receive more severe 
punishment in a criminal case than would a person outside 
these categories. On the other hand, where the victim of a 
crime was from one of the five categories of elements and 
the malfeasor had a good class background, the offender 
28. The Act is translated in Cohen, supra note 13, p. 361. 
29. See Beijing zhengfa xueyuan susong fa qiaoyan shi, Zhonghua renmin gonghequo 
xinshi susongfa jianghua (Talks on the criminal procedure law of the People's Republic 
of China), Beijing: Qunzhong Chubanshe, 1979, p. 20. (Hereafter cited as Talks on 
Criminal Procedure.) 
30. Yu Haocheng, "The Promulgation of the New Marriage Law and Handling 
Cases According to Law," Minzltu yu Fazhi, 1980, No. 10, p. II. 
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received lenient punishment or no punishment at all. This 
principle applied even to such serious offenses as rape or 
homicide. 31 
(ii) Whether the accused or the victim is a member of 
the Communist Party of China. Party members holding 
higher positions receive greater privileges and immunities. 
There are even unpublished laws to grant Party members 
or officials special privileges in cases which virtually every 
country would consider a serious offense. For instance, 
high officials such as provincial party chiefs and cabinet 
ministers are given the long, black Hongqi limousine which 
is legally excused from having to stop for unexpected 
pedestrians or bicyclists. Those who were struck or killed 
by Hongqi were not even able to collect civil damages.32 
Recently, there have been many reports of official vio-
lation of laws without punishment or remedy in various 
PRC publications.33 On the other hand, if Party officials 
lost in a power struggle or were members of a losing faction 
or were involved in a counterrevolutionary change, their 
fate would be as bad as other people in criminal cases. 
Usually, under such circumstances, high officials simply 
disappeared while middle and lower cadres could be 
brought to trial. 
(iii) The political wind of a particular time is one of 
the crucial factors in deciding the severity of punishment, if 
any, in criminal cases. This is especially true for the so-
called counterrevolutionary offenses. This factor is some-
times referred to as "killing the chicken to warn the mon-
key," that is to say, for political purposes the authorities 
will execute or severely punish one individual in order to 
warn the public.34 Thus, typically before national holidays 
or festivals, the authorities will select some suspects and 
publicly execute them to warm the public not to disrupt 
public order or commit robbery or theft during the 
festivities. 
31. See the cases reported in Cohen, supra note 13, pp. 266-267 (rape on a landlord's 
daughter), 293-294 (Cadre's kicking a person to death at a struggling meeting). 
32. See Fox Butterfield, "China, for a Fortunate Few at the Top, Is paradise of Privi-
lege and Perquisites," The New York Times, January 2, 1981, p. A6. 
33. See the discussion in "Symposium: Which One is Superior-Power or Law," 
Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1980, No. I, pp. 22-24. 
34. Wang Ruowang, supra note 21, p. 25. 
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During an "epidemic" of theft cases, for example, the authori-
ties may execute a thief with wide publicity.35 On other occasions 
and in a different climate, a person committing theft may simply be 
subject to educational lectures and then set free. 
A person convicted of making statements contrary to party pol-
icy is required to serve his entire sentence, regardless of any subse-
quent change in party policy which may justify his remarks. For 
example, in 1957, some intellectuals were arrested and sent to labor 
camps for criticizing the Soviet Union. In the early 1960s, with the 
deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, they requested the PRC au-
thorities to release them because what they said in 1957 turned out to 
be right. The authorities rejected the request on the ground that the 
statements had challenged Party policy at the time they were made 
and therefore still warranted a full sentence. 
* * * 
In addition to the three extra-legal factors discussed above, in 
1979 there began to appear some writings touching on the crucial 
question of the relationship between the Party and the administra-
tion of justice. It is well known that the Communist Party of China 
controls the public security, the procuracy and the courts. However, 
until the appearance of these writings the degree of actual control by 
the Party was not clear. These writings shed much light on this in-
teresting problem. 
Nominally, the PRC has three divisions in the administration of 
criminal justice-the public security, the procuracy (between 1951 
and 1969 and 1978 to present; see next section) and the courts-but 
in practice all are under the direction of the party committee at the 
same level and it is the committee that makes decisions as to arrest, 
prosecution and sentencing. Since the Party Committee has many 
other lines of endeavor and does not have time to review criminal 
cases, decision making in criminal cases is in practice delegated to 
the Party Committee secretary in charge of political-legal affairs. 
This system, in PRC writers' terminology, is called the system of 
"deciding a case by the secretary" (Shuji pian in pinyin).36 A writer 
describes this system as follows: 
Whether the facts of a case are clear, the evidence is con-
vincing; the defendant should be subject to criminal sane-
35. See the death sentence of a habitual thief reported in Cohen, supra note 13, pp. 
540-541. 
36. Liao Jungchang, "The Independence of Trial and [the System of] Deciding a 
Case by the Secretary," Xinan Zhengfa Xueyuan Xuehao (Journal of the Southwest Polit-
ical-Legal Institute), 1979, No. I, p. 7. 
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tion and what criminal punishment should be imposed on 
the defendant, should be sent to the secretary in charge of 
political-legal affairs of the local party committee at the 
same level for review and approval. This is called the sys-
tem of deciding a case by the secretary. 37 
The same writer also points out that this system in fact denies 
the "trial system and legal process" prescribed by law and makes 
trial by the people's court a matter of formality only. 38 The political-
legal secretary is in charge of the public security, the procuracy and 
the court of the area under the jurisdiction of the Party Committee, 
and before a case is referred to the people's court for trial, the secre-
tary must have previously approved the investigation and prosecu-
tion of the accused; similarly, the secretary must have previously 
decided the punishment to be imposed. Since the relationship be-
tween the secretary and the people's court at the same level is that 
between a superior and a subordinate, the court has no choice but to 
accept the instruction of the secretary. 
The secretary's handling of cases is simple, efficient-and fre-
quently careless. The position of political-legal secretary at the Party 
Committee is not a full-time job, and the secretary is concurrently in 
charge of many other administrative duties. He neither reviews the 
files of the accused nor personally investigates each case. He usually 
reviews and decides criminal cases only once in a one- or two-month 
period.39 According to a study on judicial work by a group of teach-
ers and cadres of a Political-Legal Institute who assisted ip handling 
accumulated criminal cases in a province between September 1974 
and October 1978, the system of deciding a case by the secretary has 
the following problems: 
(I) The secretary has voluminous tasks to do and some-
times it is not possible for him to decide cases for sev-
eral months, thus causing delay in the timely handling 
of cases. 
(2) The secretary's decision on cases usually takes the 
form of "surprise attack"; i.e., he decides several or 
even several dozen cases at one time. It is not possible 
for him carefully to study the facts, evidence and the 
nature of each individual case. 
(3) If a court disagrees with the handling of a case by the 
37. Ibid 
38. Ibid., p. 8. 
39. Ibid, p. 9. 
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Party Committee (i.e., by the political-legal secretary), 
there is no rule prescribing that the court can request 
the Party Committee to reconsider the case. The rule 
is "whatever is approved (by the Party Committee) 
should be executed." 
(4) Since arrest and sentencing are all decided by the sec-
retary on behalf of the Party Committee, in the course 
of trial by the people's court, the court has no choice 
but to sentence the accused in accordance with the de-
cision of the Party Committee, even if the result is 
contrary to law. For example, in one case, a truck 
driver accepted a bribe of more than 800 Renminbi 
(People's dollars; approximately one people's dollar is 
worth $0.50 U.S.) and in 1976 the Party Committee 
decided that he should be subject to criticism, proba-
tion of his party membership status and restitution of 
the money. However, the driver argued several times 
with the Party secretary on the correctness of the 
figure of the bribed money received, so in 1977 the 
Party secretary instructed the judicial organ to arrest 
him and sentence him to nine years imprisonment. 
(5) When the secretary decides a case incorrectly, his atti-
tude is "an official will never regret his decision"; the 
secretary consistently refuses to correct his mistakes. 
For example, in a city a homicide suspect had been 
detained for eighteen years despite the fact that the 
higher-level judicial organ had already decided that 
there was no evidence proving his guilt. He was held 
because the leadership insisted that in order "to main-
tain the decision of the city party committee" he 
should not be released.40 
* * * 
II 
Despite the emergence of many writings on legal reform, there 
appears to have been no discussion of another crucial problem-the 
administrative sanctions imposed by the public security organs. 
These are in fact criminal sanctions in a disguised form. There are 
two types of administrative sanctions in the PRC, the Security Ad-
ministrative Punishment Act and Rehabilitation Through Labor 
(Laodong jiaoyang), neither of which is subject to judicial review. 
40. "Looking at Some Problems Relating to Judicial Works from the Practice of 
Handling Cases." Xinan Zltengfa Xueyuan Xuebao, 1979, No. I, pp. 26-27. 
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The Security Administrative Punishment Act (SAPA) is not a 
unique PRC devise, having existed in pre-war Japan and Germany 
under the name of the police offense law.41 Under the SAPA, the 
police can issue warnings, require an offender to make compensation 
to a victim, impose a fine (0.50 to 30 Renminbi), confiscate articles or 
objects involved in a case and detain a person up to 15 days.42 What 
is unique in the PRC's SAPA, compared with the police offense laws, 
is that those who are detained under SAPA must assume the cost of 
their own living expense or, if unable to pay, must do equivalent 
labor to earn their living expenses.43 Another unique feature is that 
the police are empowered to impose sanctions on acts not specifically 
prohibited in the SAPA by analogy.44 Moreover, those whose SAPA 
"punishment has been completed, persons who are habitual loafers, 
who do not engage in proper employment and who repeatedly vio-
late security administration may be sent to organs of rehabilitation 
through labor if they require such rehabilitation."45 
The sanction of rehabilitation through labor was designed to 
control vagrants, minor offenders, troublemakers who did not work 
properly or who refused to comply with work assignments or trans-
fer and people who were unemployed because they had been ex-
pelled from their place of work for a breach of discipline or for being 
labeled a rightist.46 There is no time limit for placing a person under 
rehabilitation. Thus, those intellectuals who were labeled rightists in 
the 1956-57 Hundred Flower Movement and the Anti-Rightist Cam-
paign were detained for rehabilitation through labor for almost 20 
years. The treatment of these people is similar to those who are sub-
ject to the criminal sanction of reform through labor.47 
* * * 
Besides the structural and organizational problems of the PRC 
legal system stated above, recent PRC publications have also re-
vealed many serious problems in its judicial practice. The following 
is a concise summary of four major problems raised by these 
publications: 
41. See Thomas L. Blakemore, "Post-War Development in Japanese Law," Wiscon-
sin Law Review, 1947, pp. 650, and Karl Loewensteon, "Law and the Legislative Process 
in Occupied Germany: II," Yale Law Journal, Vol. 57 (1948), pp. 1018-1019. 
42. See Cohen, supra note 13, pp. 200-237. 
43. Article 3 of the SAPA. Cohen, supra note 13, p. 205. 
44. Article 31 of the SAPA. Cohen, supra note 13, p. 220. 
45. Article 30 of the SAPA. Cohen, supra note 13, p. 250. 
46. See Cohen, supra note 13, p. 249. 
47. Amnesty International Report, supra note I9, pp. 82-83. 
SOCIALIST LEGALISM 
1. Tortures, either physical or psychological, were 
frequently employed to extract confessions. This is re-
ferred to in a recent law book as the principle that "coun-
terrevolutionary cases can be uncovered through the use of 
beating by sticks."48 
2. The attitude of "rather left than right" in con-
ducting trials is a general phenomenon; that is to say, the 
judge is only interested in accepting evidence to prove the 
guilty charge of an accused and rejecting evidence 
favorable to an accused.49 
3. An accused can be detained for a long time until 
he confesses his crime or the authorities decide to conclude 
the case.50 Some accused have been detained for more 
than ten years before judgment. 51 
4. Extreme cruelty was often used in executing the 
death sentence. Before executing a political prisoner, the 
PRC authorities frequently pierced the victim's throat with 
a long needle or cut the victim's throat and inserted a steel 
tube in order to prevent the victim from shouting "reac-
tionary" slogans at the public mass sentencing and execu-
tion meeting. 52 
13 
Under this irrational, unpredictable and repressive legal system, 
it was reported that thousands of people were killed either in faction-
al fights or by authorities and that 100 million people were perse-
cuted during the Cultural Revolution period of 1966-1976.53 The 
Chinese economy also suffered severely during that period. With the 
emergence of the Deng Xiaoping leadership after the coup against 
the so-called "Gang of Four" and with Deng's emphasis on modern-
48. Talks on Criminal Procedure, supra note 29, p. 22. 
49. Ibid. 
50. Amnesty International Report, supra note 19, p. 49. 
51. E.g., Shanghai Public Security Bureau Chief Yang Fang was arrested in 1955 
and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment in 1965, after ten years of pre-trial detention. 
Chen Weisi and Xiang Wu, "Interview with Yang Fang, "Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1980, No. II, 
p. 10. 
52. E.g., the execution of Party member Zhang Zhixin was done in this way. See Yu 
Dan, "Refute: There is Nothing Serious for Cutting [the Throat Before Execution]," 
Minzhuyu Fazhi, 1979, No. I, p. 41 and Sheng Zhuhong,supra note 18, p. 21. The whole 
episode was vividly described by an article in an underground publication. See Shi 
Ming, "A Good Daughter of the People-Before and After the Heroic Death of Martyr 
Zhang Zhixin," Beijing Zhichun (The Spring of Peking), No. 8 (September 28, 1979), pp. 
12-19. 
53. See Fox Butterfield, "Peking Indictment Accuses Radicals of Killing 34,000," 
The New York Times, November 17, 1980, p. A3. 
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ization, it is obvious that substantial reform of the legal system must 
be made in order to carry out China's ambitious modernization pro-
grams. Without a stable legal system, as the experience of other 
countries has indicated, there is no way to develop China's economy. 
III. REFORM OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND ITS LIMITS 
Recent Chinese legal reform to strengthen the so-called "social-
ist legal system" can be divided into four parts: structural reorgani-
zation, enactment of necessary legislation, restoration of a defense 
lawyer system and definition of the relations between the Party and 
the judiciary. The major reforms and the limits of those reforms are 
concisely discussed below. 
1. Structural Reorganization. 
The PRC Constitution of 1954 and the laws subsequently en-
acted purported to introduce a number of democratic features to the 
judiciary, including the right of legal defense, the principle of public 
trial, and the concept of judicial independence. However, the consti-
tution and the laws were ignored after 1957 and in fact suspended 
since 1966. In 1975, in the last stage of the Cultural Revolution, the 
"Gang of Four," with the approval of Mao, enacted a new constitu-
tion to replace the 1954 Constitution. That Constitution not only 
placed the Higher People's Court and all courts below that level 
under the control of the administrative organ at the same level, but 
also abolished the procuracy.54 The procuratorate's function was ab-
sorbed by the public security. This reflected a trend that had begun 
in 1959, when the Ministry of Justice was abolished and its function 
was taken over by the Ministry of Public Security. 55 · 
The new 1978 PRC Constitution revived the people's 
procuratorates "to ensure observance of the Constitution and the law 
by all the departments under the State Council, the local organs of 
state at various levels, the personnel of organs of state and the citi-
54. See Article 25 of the 1975 Constitution and the analysis in Hungdah Chiu, "The 
Judicial System Under the New PRC Constitution," in Michael Lindsay, ed., The New 
Constitution of Communist China: Comparative Analysis, Taipei: Institute of Interna-
tional Relations, 1976, pp. 101-102. 
55. See the Resolution of the First Meeting of the Second Session of the National 
People's Congress of the PRC Relating to Abolition of the Ministry of Justice and Minis-
try of Supervision (passed on April 4, 1959) in Zhonghua renmin gongheguo fagui huibian 
(Collection of laws and regulations of the PRC), Vol. 9, Beijing: Falu chubanshe, 1959, 
p. 108. 
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zens" (Article 43).56 It also abolished the provisions on placing 
courts under the control of the administrative organ at the same 
level. 
The Ministry of Justice was restored and was assigned the fol-
lowing tasks: 
(i) Judicial administrative work, including organization, 
personnel, training of cadres and funds, of the peo-
ple's courts at all levels; 
(ii) Supervision and training of judicial cadres; 
(iii) Supervision of the administration of political legal 
institutes and training of judicial personnel in various 
specialities; 
(iv) Supervision of the work of the organizations of law-
yers and notaries; 
(v) Compilation of codes of laws and decrees; and 
(vi) Research on jurisprudence in cooperation with scien-
tific institutes and publication of books and periodi-
cals on law.57 
2. Enactment of Necessary Legislation 
Perhaps the most serious defect of the PRC's legal system was 
the lack of legislation for the judiciary and government organs. 
Many new laws were enacted in 1979-1980, of which the most im-
portant are the Criminal Law58 and the Criminal Procedure Law.59 
The Criminal Law has a total of 192 articles and is divided into 
two parts (general principles and specific parts). The law does make 
more specific the types of acts subject to criminal sanctions. For in-
stance, it narrows the definition of a counterrevolutionary by 
stressing that such a person must have committed some overt act; 
apparently, the mere harboring of a damaging thought against "the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and the social system" is not a crimi-
nal act (Article 90). However, there remain some provisions which 
are still quite vague in defining the kinds of conduct that come 
within their reach. For instance, Articles 116 and 117 provide penal-
ties for "grave" violations of customs, foreign exchange, tax and 
56. English text of the Constitution in Peking Review, Vol. 2I, No. II (March II, 
1978), pp. 5-14. 
57. See "New Minister of Justice Interviewed," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 42 
(March 2, 1979), pp. 3-4. 
58. Text published in Renmin Rihao (People's Daily), July 7, 1979, pp. I, 3, 4. 
59. Text published in Guangmrng Rihao (Enlightenment Daily), July 8, 1979, pp. I, 2, 
3. 
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other regulations. These penalties are to be imposed in addition to 
the administrative sanctions provided by the regulations themselves, 
but nowhere does the law define the term "grave violations." 
The most serious defect of the new Criminal Law is its reten~ion 
of the analogy principle of the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act. Arti-
cle 79 of the Criminal Law provides: 
Those who commit acts not explicitly defined in the 
specific parts of the criminal law may be convicted and sen-
tenced, after obtaining the approval of the Supreme Peo-
ple's Court, according to the most similar article in the law. 
This analogy principle is in conflict with one of the basic maxims of 
criminal justice: Nullum crimen sine lege (No crime without a pre-
existing law making the act a crime), which is also incorporated in 
Article II, paragraph 2, of the 1948 International Declaration of 
Human Rights.60 Despite the publication of many writings on law in 
the PRC, none has dared to challenge the propriety of including this 
principle in the Criminal Law; in fact, almost every commentator 
has sought to justify retention of the analogy principle. Most of 
them argued that because law cannot be drafted so as to define every 
possible criminal offense, the use of analogy is necessary.61 How-
ever, the commentators do not explain why only Mongolia, North 
Korea and Albania among the communist countries retain this prin-
ciple in their criminal law, while other communist countries have all 
rejected it. 
It is believed that there may be two reasons for the PRC's reten-
tion of the principle of analogy in its Criminal Law. First, the func-
tion of the Criminal Law, as stated in Article 2, is "to use 
punishment to struggle against all counterrevolutionary and other 
criminal acts, defend the dictatorship of the proletariat. ... " Thus 
the Criminal Law remains primarily an instrument of class struggle 
and it is therefore desirable to maintain a certain flexibility so that 
the law, if necessary, can be manipulated for political purposes. Sec-
60. Article II, paragraph 2, provides: "No one shall be held guilty of any penal 
offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offense, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed." William W. Bishop, 
Jr., International Law, Cases and Materials, 3rd ed., Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown 
and Co., 1971, p. 466. 
61. See, e.g., Zheng Youtian, Zheng Dingyi and Zhao Changqing, Zhonghua renmin 
gonghequo xinfa ;ioen zhishi jianghua (Talks on fundamental knowledge of the criminal 
law of the People's Republic of China), [Zhongqin]: Xinan zhengfa xueyuan 
xinfaqiaoyan shi, [1979), p. 37, and Tao Xijin, "Problems in the Study of Criminal Law," 
Faxue Yanjiu, 1979, No. 5, p. 7. 
SOCIALIST LEGALISM 17 
ond, the Criminal Law was poorly drafted (as are most of the PRC 
laws), so it is necessary to retain this principle to supplement possible 
gaps in the Law. For instance, several PRC writers have cited medi-
cal malpractice cases as requiring the principle of analogy.62 This is 
because the Criminal Law does not have provisions on homicide or 
bodily injury committed by "a person in the performance of his oc-
cupation," in spite of the fact that such provisions exist in almost 
every other criminal code. 
The new Criminal Procedure Law has a total of 164 articles and 
is divided into four parts: General Principles, Establishment of a 
Case, Preliminary Investigation and Public Prosecution, and Trial 
and Execution. On paper, the new law makes a major step toward 
rule by law, rather than by decree or whim. Article 4 provides that 
all citizens are equal before the law and that no privileges will be 
allowed before law. Earlier, in 1978, the PRC released many intel-
lectuals who had been sent to labor camps during the 1957 Anti-
Rightist Campaign, and in January 1979, the PRC proclaimed a new 
policy toward former landlords and rich peasants by announcing 
that "as long as former landlords and rich peasants and their de-
scendants support socialism, they will no longer be discriminated 
against."63 Many writers in the PRC also urged that Party members 
and officials should be subject to normal criminal process and should 
enjoy no privilege before the law. 
The Law also gives an accused the right to defend himself or to 
hire a lawyer to do so (Article 26), as well as requiring an arrest 
warrant and for notification of the family of the arrested within 24 
hours (Article 50).64 It also limits the maximum preliminary deten-
62. See, e.g., Li Y ouyi, "On the Stipulation and Analogy of Offenses and Penalties," 
Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No.5, p. 23. 
63. "Policy Towards Descendants of Landlords and Rich Peasants," Beijing Review, 
Vol. 22, No.4 (January 26, 1979), p. 8. Whether the cadres do seriously implement this 
policy on the local level is far from clear. 
64. A new Arrest and Detention Law was promulgated in February 1979 to replace a 
similar law promulgated in 1954. See note 5, supra. The new law establishes three con-
ditions for future arrests: 
(I) The principal facts relating to the crime committed must be thor-
oughly investigated; 
(2) The crime or crimes must be such that the criminal will be liable, if 
convicted, to be sentenced to imprisonment; and 
(3) The arrest must be absolutely necessary. 
However, under the new law public security organs will be able to detain.major suspects 
or persons accused of a crime before obtaining a warrant from the people's court or 
procuratorate in such exigent cases as assault and battery, robbery, and seriously under-
mining work, production, and social orders. Evidence against the detainees must be sub-
mitted to the appropriate people's procuratorate within three days or, in special 
18 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
tion during an investigation to three months (but the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's Congress may indefinitely extend the 
detention period for specific cases) (Article 92) and provides for pub-
lic trials (Article 110), mandatory review of all death sentences by 
the Supreme People's Court (Article 144), and other progressive 
measures. 
In view of the widespread use of torture and reliance on confes-
sions in criminal trials in the past, the law specifically provides in 
Article 32 that "it is strictly forbidden to extort confessions by torture 
or under duress and to collect evidence by threat, enticement, deceit 
and other 'illegal means'." Article 35 stresses that a judgment may 
not be predicated upon a confession unsupported by extrinsic 
evidence: 
In handing down judgments on all cases, stress shall be 
laid on the weight of evidence and on investigation and 
study, and no credence shall be given to a statement made 
by the accused under examination. When there is only a 
statement by the accused and no other evidence available, 
the accused shall not be considered guilty and sentenced; 
when there is no statement by the accused, but there is full, 
conclusive evidence against him, the accused may be con-
sidered guilty and sentenced. 
In spite of the above-mentioned reforms, the drafters of the new 
Criminal Procedure Law nevertheless refused to adopt a fundamen-
tal maxim of criminal justice: The presumption of innocence of an 
accused until he is proved guilty. This principle is incorporated in 
Article II, paragraph I of the International Declaration of Human 
Rights and in the criminal procedure law of almost every country.65 
Because the Law did not specifically reject that principle, but just 
refused to adopt it, Chinese writers felt that there remained some 
room for debating this problem. 
A widely circulated textbook on criminal procedure law dis-
missed this principle outright as bourgeois and unsuitable for China 
circumstances, seven days. The procuratorate must either sanction the arrest or order the 
release of the detainee within three days. The law further provides that interrogation 
must start within 24 hours after any arrest, and the detainee must be released if no posi-
tive evidence is found. 
65. Article II, paragraph I, provides: "Everyone charged with a penal offense has 
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a public trial at 
which he has had aU the guarantees necessary for his defense." Cited in Bishop, supra 
note 60, p. 466. 
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without giving any reasons.66 Several writers argued that the pre-
sumption of innocence may result in setting many criminals free and 
would be unfavorable to the struggle against criminals.67 Another 
writer said that this principle is inconsistent with the judicial practice 
of China because, in 1980, 95 percent of the persons arrested were 
found guilty by the courts. However, he suggested that in borderline 
cases where the evidence was insufficient to prove the guilt of the 
suspect, this principle should be applied so that the judiciary would 
not detain the suspect indefinitely.68 Two writers nevertheless ar-
gued strongly for the adoption of this principle in the criminal pro-
cess.69 A recently published Chinese law dictionary explained the 
presumption of innocence as a bourgeois theory of criminal process 
but did not attack it-7° Because the law dictionary is a collective 
work, its low-profile handling of this principle seems to indicate that 
the debate on this issue has not yet been totally closed. 
Another area in which legislation which was badly needed was 
in the fields of civil and economic law. As a Chinese article said: 
Development of the productive forces in China will neces-
sitate major chan~es in the relations of production as well 
as in the superstructure, of which laws, decrees and rules 
and regulations form an important component. To this 
end, various laws and regulations on economic work, in-
cluding those for the people's communes and factories, ful-
fillment of contracts, protection of forests, grasslands and 
the environment, will be drafted and gradually perfected. 
Judicial organs will be established to arbitrate disputes and 
lawsuits between enterprises.71 
So far, the progress in this area has been limited, as at the time of 
this writing in April 1981, the Civil Law has not been enacted and 
66. Talks on Criminal Procedure, supra note 29, p. 55. 
67. See, e.g., Zhang Zipei, "An Analysis of the Principle of 'Presumption of Inno-
cence'," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No.3, p. 33, and Liao Zengyun, "Views on the Principle of 
'Presumption of Innocence'," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 5, p. 33. 
68. Cheng Guanyzhong, ''The Principle of Presumption of Innocence Should be 
Critically Assimilated," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 4, pp. 35, 36. 
69. Wang Bingxin, "A Study on the Principle of 'Presumption of Innocence'," Xinan 
Zheng(a Xueyuan Xuehao, 1919, No. 1, pp. 15-5, and Zhao Guangyu, ''The Meaning and 
Application of the Principle of 'Presumption of Innocence,'" Faxue Yanjiu, 1981, No. I, 
pp. 23-25. 
70. Faxue Cidian (Law Dictionary), Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1980, p. 
66. 
71. "Prospect and Retrospect, China's Socialist Legal System," supra note 3, p. 30. 
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only a few laws relating to foreign investment are in force. 72 
3. Restoration of the Defense Lawyer System. 
The lawyer system before 1949 was abolished by the Chinese 
Communists when they took over mainland China. Beginning in 
1955, the PRC tried to introduce "people's lawyers" to its judiciary, 
but since the 1957 Anti-Rightists Campaign the profession of lawyer 
gradually disappeared.73 During the Cultural Revolution period, 
the Party policy of "dealing leniently with those who confess and 
severely with those who resist" strongly discouraged accused persons 
from even asserting a defense, so there was little room for a defense 
lawyer system. 
Both the Constitution of 1978 and the new Criminal Procedure 
Law recognize the right of an accused to defend himself, and the 
latter also recognizes the right to hire a lawyer to defend one's case. 74 
On August 26, 1980, the Standing Committee of the National Peo-
ple's Congress adopted the Provisional Act of the PRC on Law-
yers,75 which formally restored the lawyer system. The Act will 
enter into force on January 1, 1982, but the PRC has already allowed 
certain lawyers to start practice. There is, however, a serious 
shortage of lawyers in almost every part of China.76 
4. Defining the Relationship between the Party and the 
Judiciary. 
The new leadership in the PRC in its post-Mao reform has at-
tempted to some extent to separate the party and the government in 
administration. Whether this policy should be applied to the judici-
ary was an important question in law reform. In July 1979, the Pres-
ident of the Supreme People's Court, Jiang Hua, said he personally 
approved the abolition of Party Committee review of cases and 
urged further study of this issue. 77 With this green light, scholars 
and judicial personnel began a lively discussion. At the First Aca-
demic Seminar organized by the Chongqing (Chungking) City Law 
72. E.g., The Law on Joint Ventures with Chinese and Foreign Investment, trans-
lated in Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 29 (July 20, 1979), pp. 3-4. 
73. See Shao-chuan Leng,supra note 16, p. 13 and Ruge,supra note 16, pp. 120-121. 
74. See Article 26 of the Criminal Procedure Law. 
75. Renmin Ribao, August 27, 1980, p. 4. 
76. See, e.g., Wang Qinghua, "Why One Cannot Get a Lawyer?" Minzhu yu Fazhi, 
1979, No. 2, p. 36. 
77. Jiang Hua, "Rectifying Thought Line to Accept New Long March," Minzhu yu 
Fazhi, 1979, No.2, p. 4. 
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Association on October 22 and 23, 1979, the majority expressed the 
following view, as summarized by a participant: 
The procuracy and the court should independently exercise 
their function; i.e., in handling cases, they should insist to 
rely on facts and laws and should not allow any organs, 
groups and individuals outside the judicial organs, through 
open or secret methods, to interfere. The leadership exer-
cised by the various level party committees toward the cad-
res of the procuracy and the court should primarily focus 
on strict supervision over their executing guidelines and 
policy and their strict compliance with and impartial exe-
cution of the law.78 
At the seminar, the participants also engaged in a sharp debate 
over the merits of the system of Party Committee review and ap-
proval of the cases. One view was that the system was correct be-
cause it served the needs of class struggle at different times and 
facilitated the execution of security work. Another view considered 
this system to be one of the causes for unjust, false and wrongly de-
cided cases. It was maintained that retainin~ the system of Party 
Committee review had resulted in more injustice than justice within 
the framework of the socialist legal system. It was said that during 
the special period of military control in the early years of liberation, 
it had been necessary for the party committee to approve cases, but 
that this was an expediency best confined to those early years. After 
the promulgation of the Constitution and the organic laws for the 
procuracy and the court, the continuance of the system of party com-
mittee approval of cases frequently resulted in replacing law with the 
Party's policy, which was disadvantageous to perfecting and 
strengthening the socialist legal system. The supporters of this view 
further pointed out that the approval of cases by the Party Commit-
tee in practice is performed by the secretary in charge of political-
legal work alone and that this delegation of authority inevitably re-
sulted in subordinating the law to one individual's view.79 The con-
clusion of the participants of the seminar, as reported by one 
participant, is as follows: 
Based on the experience of thirty years' judicial practice 
and in accordance with the situation and special features of 
current class struggle, it is entirely correct to have the 
78. Li Jinrong, "Chongqing [Chungking] City Law Association Held an Academic 
Seminar,'' Xinan Zllengfa Xueyuan Xuehao, 1919, No. 2, p. 59. 
79. Ihid 
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procuracy and the court to exercise their functions indepen-
dently and to change the system of party committee's ap-
proval of cases. 80 
Other writers also supported the separation of the Party and ju-
diciary and argued strongly in favor of restricting Party Committee 
leadership over judicial work to guidelines and policies, stopping 
short of any functions in reviewing individual cases.81 In January 
1980, the President of the Supreme People's Court publicly said that 
Party leadership over judicial work should be limited primarily to 
the guidelines and policies of the judiciary and should thoroughly 
guarantee that the courts may conduct trials independently.82 Simi-
larly, the Chief Procurator of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
Huang Huoqing, also said that "procuratorates at various levels 
must be placed under the leadership of the party committee, and 
they must report to and seek instruction from the party committee 
with respect to major guidelines and policy problems," thus implying 
that the Party Committee should not intervene in the handling of 
individual cases by the procuratorates. 83 
Finally, on August 24, 1980, Jiang Hua told the Beijing Crimi-
nal Trials Conference that the Party has decided to abolish the sys-
tem of Party Committee review and approval of cases. 84 The extent 
to which this policy will be fully implemented remains to be seen. 
The movement toward law reform, while it has at least appar-
ently attempted to establish a stable legal system, also has two im-
portant limitations. First, the PRC still wants to retain some of its 
flexible laws for political maneuvering. Thus, the practice of reha-
bilitation through labor, i.e., the placing of a person in a labor camp 
for up to four years, without judicial review, is maintained;85 and the 
80. Ibid. 
81. E.g., Liu Guangming, "The People's Courts Administer Justice Independently, 
Subject only to the Law, "Faxue Yanjiu, 1919, No. 3, p. 30; Zhang Jinqing and Xie 
Bangyu," Independent Administering of Justice and the Leadership of the Communist 
Party," Faxue Yanjiu, 1980, No. 2, p. 28; and Zhang Youyu, "Equality of Everyone 
Before the Law and Judicial Independence," Minzhu yu Fazhi, 1980, No. 10, p. 3. 
82. See Renmin Ribao, January II, 1980, p. I. 
83. Ibid. 
84. Renmin Ribao, August 25, 1980, p. I; "Chinese Court Official Seeks Less Political 
Interference," The New York Times, August 25, 1980, p. AS. 
85. On November 29, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Con-
gress passed "Supplementary Regulations Concerning Rehabilitation through Labor," 
which provide, inter alia, for the establishment of a Governing Commission on Rehabili-
tation through Labor in Provinces, Autonomous Zones, Large and Middle Size Cities. 
The duration of rehabilitation through labor is from one to three years and may be ex-
tended for another year. Renmin Ribao, November 30, 1979, p. I. 
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continued validity of formerly enacted vague criminal legislation, 
such as the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act86 and the State Secret 
Act,87 has been explicitly confirmed. The State Secret Act includes 
almost everything in the PRC as "state secrets" and anyone who 
leaks those "secrets" to a domestic or foreign enemy is subject to 
punishment as a counterrevolutionary. 88 
Second, the PRC's legal system is a "Socialist Legal System," 
which, as stated in a recent Chinese law dictionary, means "the prin-
ciple of handling business strictly according to law under the dicta-
torship of the proletariat."89 This is considered to be an "important 
condition for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat." This 
concept is usually referred to in communist legal theory as "socialist 
legality" and will be analyzed in the next section. 
IV. SOCIALIST LEGALITY, THE CASE OF WEI 
JINGSHENG AND THE TRIAL OF THE GANG OF 
FOUR AND LIN BIAO CLIQUE 
The concepts of socialist legality and socialist democracy 
originated in the Soviet Union; between 1954 and 1957, the PRC 
tried to establish a government and state structure based on that 
model. Since 1957, the Chinese, of course, moved farther and far-
ther away from the Soviet model. However, there is an obvious 
trend in China to go back to that model, as is explained below. 
According to Soviet concepts of socialist legality and socialist 
democracy, legality and democracy are conditioned by the needs of 
socialism; the latter needs, in tum, are defined by the Communist 
Party in its leadership role. As a consequence, no principle, however 
normatively stated in the constitution or law, is permitted to conflict 
with the policy needs of the Communist Party. Although these two 
concepts do contain the potential for instability and lack of predict-
ability in the legal system, the Soviet legal system does not, as a rule, 
operate arbitrarily or in an ad hoc fashion. Stability and predictabil-
ity are important elements in the ordering of any society, including 
86. Despite the promulgation of the Criminal Law, this Act was never abolished and 
just a few weeks before the entry into force of new Criminal Law, Wei Jingsheng was 
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment in accordance with the 1951 Act. See "Wei Jing-
sheng Sentenced," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43, (October 26, 1979), pp. 6-7. For a 
discussion of this case, see Hungdah Chiu, "Structural Changes in the Organization and 
Operation of China's Criminal Justice System," Review of Socialist Law, Vol. 7, No. I 
(March 1981), pp. 62-65. 
87. Republished in Renmin Ribao, April II, 1980, pp. I, 3. 
88. Anicle 13 of the Act. 
89. Faxue Cidian, supra note 70, p. 352. 
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Soviet society, so these two elements are embodied in Soviet socialist 
legality and socialist democracy. However, the stability and predict-
ability which are part of socialist legality and socialist democracy do 
not inhibit arbitrary state action in areas of special Party concern, 
such as the security of the regime and the integrity of the Communist 
system.90 This distortion of the legal system appears, for example, in 
the so-called dissidents' cases. 
While there is no doubt that the members of the present PRC 
leadership have made serious efforts to strengthen the legal system 
and to carry out necessary legal reform, they also made it clear that 
the legal system can only operate within the so-called "Four Basic 
Principles"-namely, keeping to the socialist road, upholding the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, Party leadership and Marxism-Lenin-
ism-Mao Zedong Thought.91 Thus, regardless of the present leader-
ship's pledge to the rule of law, if an individual attempted to 
challenge one or more of the four basic principles, it would be futile 
for that person to rely on the socialist legal system to guarantee him 
a fair trial. The case of Wei Jingsheng is an example. 
Wei Jingsheng was a native of Anhui Province, in Central 
China, where he was born in 1950. Both of his parents were Party 
officials, and he was intensively indoctrinated with Communist theo-
ries from his childhood. During the Cultural Revolution, he joined 
the Red Guards in 1966, but was jailed for four months early in 
1967. With the gradual subsidence of the Cultural Revolution in 
1969, Wei enlisted in the People's Liberation Army, which enabled 
him to travel widely through China. Demobilized in 1973, he turned 
down an offer to become an official and took a job as an electrician 
in the Peking Zoo. 92 
In December 1978 Wei began an underground sheet called Tan-
shuo (Exploration) and posted it on Xi dan Wall, the now-abolished 
"Democracy Wall," in Peking. It included an essay bearing his sig-
nature and calling on the Communist leaders to add a fifth item to 
their official list of modernizations the country should achieve in ag-
riculture, industry, science and defense. The fifth and most neces-
sary, he wrote, was democracy,93 not socialist democracy under the 
90. See Bernard Ramundo, The Soviet Legal System, A Primer, Chicago: American 
Bar Association, I971, pp. 22-28. 
91. "Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation (April-June 1979)," The China Quar-
terly, No. 79 (September 1979), p. 670. 
92. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," 
The New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9. 
93. Part of Wei's article, "The Fifth Modernization-Democracy and Others," is 
translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The Asian Wall Street .Journal 
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leadership of Communist Party. 
Later, Exploration became a mimeographed magazine publish-
ing many articles exposing the human rights situation in China. For 
instance, in the March 1979 issue of Exploration, an article entitled 
"The Bastille of the Twentieth Century-Qincheng ( Ch 'in ch 'eng in 
Wade-Giles) No. I Prison"94 vividly described the inhumane treat-
ment and torture of political prisoners in China. On March 29, 1979, 
Wei was arrested. 
On October 16, 1979, more than six months after his arrest, Wei 
was brought to trial by the Peking Municipal Intermediate People's 
Court and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, with deprivation of 
political rights for an additional three years. Wei was convicted of 
providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and carrying 
out counterrevolutionary agitation.95 
Wei Jingsheng lodged an appeal against the court's judgment to 
the Peking Municipal Higher People's Court. On November 6, 1979, 
in one day's time, this court concluded the debate between the prose-
cutor and Wei and rejected the appeal.96 Under the PRC's legal pro-
cess, the case was thus affirmed; no further appeal to the Supreme 
People's Court is permitted.97 
A thorough analysis of the merits of the prosecution and Wei's 
defense is beyond the scope of this paper. Here, the focus is prima-
rily on the procedural aspects of the case. First, although a notice on 
the wall of the court on October 16 had said that the trial of Wei 
would be open to the public, none of Wei's family members or 
friends were allowed to enter the court room. Foreign correspon-
dents were turned away. Several hundred spectators were taken in, 
but a woman who attended said afterward that she had received her 
ticket the day before the trial at her work place and had been in-
structed to attend. 98 
-------------------------------
Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. Complete text can be found in Da/u dixia kanwu 
huibian (Ta-/u t'i-hsia k'an-wu hui-pien in Wade-Giles), Collection of the Mainland Un-
derground Publications), Book I, Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist 
Problems, 1980, pp. 2-11. 
94. See Fox Butterfield, "Peking Dissident, in Rare Account, Tells of Political Pris-
oners' Torture," The New York Times, May 7, 1979, pp. AI, AIO. 
95. See "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," supra note 86. 
96. "The People's Verdict-Wei Jingsheng's Appeal Rejected," Beijing Review, Vol. 
22, No. 46 (November 16, 1979), pp. 15-16. 
97. See Xing Zhong, "Judicial Organs and Judicial Procedure in China," Beijing Re-
view, Vol. 22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 32. 
98. See Fox Butterfield, "Leading Chinese Dissident gets 15-year Prison Term," The 
New York Times, October 17, 1979, p. A3. 
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Second, the Court apparently was not confident of the legal ba-
sis, under the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act, upon which the charge 
and sentence against Wei were based. The court therefore invoked 
the catch-all Article 16 provision allowing for punishment for crime 
by analogy.99 
Third, one of the charges against Wei was that he supplied mili-
tary secrets regarding the Sino-Vietnamese War to a foreigner. In 
regard to the question of proof required for a conviction, it is instruc-
tive to note that the foreigner to whom the secrets were allegedly 
supplied was neither called to testify nor identified. However, one 
spectator said that the prosecutor, during the reading of a two-hour 
indictment, had mentioned several countries, including Great Brit-
ain and France. 100 If the recipient was indeed a national of one of 
these countries, then Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Counterrevo-
lutionary Act on "supplying intelligence to a domestic or foreign en-
emy" was certainly not applicable, because Great Britain and France 
definitely are not "enemies" of the PRC today. Ironically, the day 
before Wei's trial, Hua Guofeng, the PRC's Communist Party 
Chairman and then Prime Minister, began his three-week visit to 
four European countries, including France and Great Britain . 
• • • 
If the handling of a case through regular legal procedure would 
undermine or tarnish the leadership of the Communist Party of 
China, then under the concept of socialist legality, legal procedure 
could be disregarded or distorted to suit Party policy. The trials of 
the "Gang of Four" and the Lin Biao Clique illustrate the 
supremacy of the Party over law. 
First, since these trials were essentially political in nature, it was 
politically desirable to include among the judges and procurators 
representatives of all factions opposing the Gang of Four and the 
Lin Biao Clique, so as to demonstrate the unity of these factions 
against their common enemy. Moreover, no group in the PRC can 
retain power without the support of the military, so the participation 
of the military in the trials was politically essential. For these rea-
sons, the regular courts were disregarded and a special court was 
created 101 to handle the trials so that the selection of judges and 
99. See supra note 15, and accompanying text. 
100. See Fox Butterfield, supra note 98. 
101. See the decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
adopted on September 29, 1980. "Principal Culprits of the Counter-Revolutionary Cli-
ques of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing to be Tried," Beijing Review, Vol. 23, No. 40 (October 6, 
1980), p. 3. 
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procurators could satisfy the requirements of the Party and the 
military. 102 
Second, because of the political nature of the trials, the unity of 
the judges in conducting the trials and rendering the sentences was 
essential. This unity could be guaranteed only if each and every 
judge had a personal grievance against the defendants. While a 
judge in the PRC would rarely, if ever, refuse to follow Party direc-
tives as to the outcome of a judicial case, the PRC sought to avoid 
the slightest risk of possible deviation in these politically sensitive 
cases. For this reason, the procedures for the Gang of Four trials 
completely ignored Article 23 of the Criminal Procedure Law requir-
ing the withdrawal of judges and other participants who may be par-
ties to the case or close relatives of the parties or who may have an 
interest in the case or whose close relatives may have an interest in 
the case. For example, both Jiang Hua, chief judge of the special 
court, and Huang Huoqing, chief procurator of the special 
procuratorate, were among the alleged victims listed in the indict-
ment. 103 Among the thirty-five judges, at least twenty had allegedly 
been persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, and most of the 
others were directly related to people who had suffered similarly. 104 
Third, the PRC has decided to keep Mao Zedong thought as an 
official ideology. It was therefore essential to ensure that Mao's im-
age would not be irreparably tarnished in the trials. On this point, a 
senior Chinese general wrote recently: "Just imagine: what would 
take the place of Mao Zedong thought if it were really aban-
doned?"10 Recently, the Communist Party has been seriously con-
cerned by evidence that increasing numbers of people-especially 
young pe~jle-have shown little enthusiasm for socialism or Com-
munism.' If the Party wants to remain in power, its leaders realize, 
102. For instance, one of the deputy chiefs of the special procuratorate, Shi Jingqian, 
is deputy-director of the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA). Wu Ziuquan, deputy chief of the General Staff of the PLA, was appointed chief 
judge of the second tribunal of the special court. See note 101, supra. 
103. See the Indictment of the Special Procuratorate, November 2, 1980. Renmin 
Ribao, November 21, 1980, p. 2. Reprinted also inFeijing Yuebao (Fei-chingyueh-pao in 
Wade-Giles, Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly), Vol. 23, No.6 (December 1980), p. 
79. 
104. See James P. Sterba, "Former Chinese Leaders Given Long Prison Terms," The 
New York Times, January 26, 1981, p. A3. 
105. See General Huang Kecheng's article in April 10, 1981 Liberation Army Daily, 
reported in Bradley K. Martin "Chinese critique of Mao cites 'shortcomings' and 'mis-
takes' of later years," The Sun (Baltimore), April 12, 1981, p. A4. 
106. See Fox Butterfield, "Apathy Replaces Marxist Idealism Among Chinese," The 
New York Times, December 30, 1980, p. AI. 
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it cannot afford to offer the people a free choice of ideologies or they 
may well choose to throw the Communists out. For this reason, the 
"open trial" requirement of the Criminal Procedure Law was not 
strictly followed; the PRC leaders did not want to provide the de-
fendants, especially Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, the opportunity to shift 
the blame to Mao in a public forum, attributing all their alleged 
crimes to Mao's instructions. 107 
Fourth, the PRC has been committed to publishing the judg-
ment rendered by the trials, but it does not want to disclose the full 
. details of the intra-Party power struggle since such a disclosure 
would severely tarnish the party's image among the people. For this 
reason, the judgments failed to establish a direct causal link between 
the defendants and the numerous deaths that took place during the 
Cultural Revolution. As a result, the judgments frequently referred 
vaguely to the "persecution to death" of many victims of the Cul-
tural Revolution, but presented no direct evidence linking the Gang 
of Four with any of the deaths. 108 
Fifth, for similar reasons, the defendants' right of defense, guar-
anteed by the 1978 Constitution and Article 26 of the Criminal Pro-
cedure Law, was virtually abrogated. Those defendants who chose 
to defend themselves were denied the right to call witnesses. They 
had requested and were prevented from seriously cross-examining 
the prosecution witnesses. Similarly, for the five defendants who 
chose to appoint or accept the court's appointment of defense coun-
sel, their lawyers did not play any active role in their protection or 
defense. None of the defense lawyers objected to any of the prosecu-
tion's questions or asked to cross-examine a single witness. In the 
case ofYao Wenyuan, a former Polibureau member, his lawyer only 
made his case worse. Yao only acknowledged that he had commit-
ted mistakes but denied the allegation that he had controlled and 
used the mass media to agitate an overthrow of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. His defense lawyer, however, said that Yao was one 
107. The PRC had claimed that it was an "open trial" in the sense that "the various 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government, 
political parties, people's organizations, government organs and PLA can send represent-
atives to attend the trials as observers." See supra note 101,. 
None of these observers, however, was permitted to make any comment on the tri-
als, other than to praise the proceedings as fair. Moreover, the 30 Chinese media corre-
spondents who had been invited to observe the trial were not allowed to issue any 
individual report; all news concerning the trials was uniformly released by the Xinhua 
News Agency. 
108. See Richard Berstein, "'Gang of 4' Trial Dramatic But Case Far From Proved," 
Washington Star, December 14, 1980, p. All. 
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of the main culprits of a counterrevolutionary clique led by Jiang 
Qing, thus refuting his argument of only committing mistakes. 109 
Finally, in order to bring these politically sensitive trials to a 
speedy conclusion and thereby avoid undue publicity for the defend-
ants, the right of appeal was denied to the defendants. This is con-
trary to the Criminal Procedure Law and even to the PRC practice 
before the implementation of this law.U0 
V. CONCLUSION 
The PRC's recent legal reforms, even with the limitations stated 
above, if substantially but not fully implemented, would establish a 
more stable "socialist" legal system. Such a system certainly would 
be beneficial to the PRC's ambitious modernization program. How-
ever, whether the PRC will actually implement these legal reforms, 
at least in their most substantial aspects, remains questionable. On 
the positive side, the present leadership appears to understand fully 
that the Chinese legal system must be strengthened and perfected so 
as to provide an orderly, predictable environment for the national 
modernization program. Moreover, during the turmoil of the Cul-
tural Revolution, the lack of discipline among the people, workers, 
and pe·asants seriously affected production on various levels; there 
were also serious problems, including inefficiency, corruption and 
waste, in the operation of state enterprises. To put its house in order, 
it will also be necessary to re-establish social discipline and order 
and to put the operation of state enterprises in order through the 
mechanism of law. Furthermore, the experience of the Cultural 
Revolution, in which the present leadership and their followers were 
also victims, seems to have taught the present leaders that a more 
stable and less repressive legal system is not just for the benefit of the 
great majority of the Chinese people but also for the benefit of the 
leaders themselves and their followers. 
On the other hand, one must realize certain important negative 
elements concerning the establishment of a stable legal system in 
China. The modem type of legal system with a separation of power 
among the police (public security), procurator and the courts was 
unknown to traditional China. The thirty years of Communist rule 
further strengthened, rather than weakened, that tradition. In order 
to overcome that obstacle embedded deeply in Chinese tradition, the 
leadership must make every effort to comply fully with the laws they 
109. "Report from the Court, Special Court Continues Debates" Beijing Review, VoL 
23, No. 52 (December 29, 1980), pp. 18-19. 
110. See Xing Zhong, supra note 97, p. 32. 
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promulgate and to show to the people that they are serious about 
implementing the laws. To select the Gang of Four and Lin Biao 
Clique Trials to publicize the new legal system was, in its context, an 
unwise decision because, as analyzed in previous sections, the trials 
were conducted in gross violation of the newly promulgated Crimi-
nal Procedure Law. Instead of enhancing respect for law, to many 
people the trials cast serious doubts on the sincerity of the present 
leadership's purported goal of establishing a just legal system. As a 
western correspondent reported: 
"We all know it is not a trial but a power struggle," [one 
Chinese said]. "If Jiang Qing had won, it would be Deng 
who is on trial, or worse, hauled before a mass rally .... " 
The leaders may be disappointed by these sentiments, 
which have been expressed by many people. They evi-
dently hoped that the trial would not only finally exorcise 
the ghost of the Cultural Revolution but also show progress 
toward establishing a fair legal system. 
Instead the trial has raised some serious questions 
b . . 111 a out JUStice. . . . 
Second, the Chinese society, instead of practicing the egalitari-
anism that some China scholars ascribed to the PRC, has been a 
strict class society since 1949. A higher rank in the Party, govern-
ment or military units provides greater access to the amenities of life 
which cannot be purchased by money. Also, the higher one's posi-
tion, the greater one's privileges and immunities. These privileges 
and immunities also extend to one's children, relatives, and occa-
sionally to close friends. 112 Since the PRC relies on the loyalty of 
this privileged class to control the people, it would be difficult for the 
leadership to enforce the principle of equality of everyone before the 
law. 
Third, the lack of a sufficient number of trained legal personnel 
to run the new legal system is another serious problem. It has been 
estimated that the PRC needs two-hundred thousand legal person-
nel.113 However, since 1949 the PRC has turned out only several 
thousand law graduates, with only several hundred more graduating 
since 1979. The courts and the procuratorates are now staffed with 
Ill. Fox Butterfield, "Revenge Seems to Outweigh Justice at Chinese Trial." The New 
York Times, December 6, 1980, p. 2. 
112. See note 32 J191ra. 
· 113. Fox Butterfield, "Definition of Crimes Clarified by Peking," The New York 
Times, July 10, 1979, p. All, quoting the view of Qing Duansheng, a Harvard-trained 
political scientist in the PRC. 
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many persons who lack formal legal training. In 1975, it was re-
ported that the majority of judges came from among the ranks of 
peasants, workers and military personnel. 114 The moral quality, not 
to question the legal training, of at least some of these judges is also 
poor, as revealed by some recent cases. In one case, the president of 
a tribunal raped a female involved in a bigamy case. 115 One recent 
article said that a substantial number of judicial works accepted 
bribes and rendered judgments against innocent people while they 
set criminals free. 116 General Ye Jienying, Chairman of the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's Congress, said in December 
1978 that "there must be fearless procurators and judges who are 
ready to sacrifice their lives to uphold the dignity of the legal sys-
tem" if China wants to make its legal system perfect} 17 However, 
the harshness of the penalties for incorrect thought and expression, 
combined with a long history of political upheaval, make it unlikely 
that such fearless procurators and judges will soon emerge in the 
PRC. When the penalty for a politically incorrect judgment may be 
conviction of the judge himself as a counterrevolutionary or punish-
ment by rehabilitation through labor, the reasons for judicial timid-
ity are self-evident. In 1957, four Supreme Court judges did speak 
out on how to improve the administration of justice in China, but 
they were soon declared rightists and have not been heard from since 
then.U8 
Fourth, the PRC's high crime rate 119 and the social distur-
bances, 120 both caused primarily by high unemployment rate, 121 may 
also induce the present leadership to resort to drastic, extra-legal 
114. Ruge, supra note 16, p. 121. 
115. "President of A Tribunal Arrested for Raping a Litigant," Minzltu yu Fazhi, 
1980, No. ll, p. 33. 
116. Commentator, "We Should Guarantee that Law Will be Enforced," Minzltu yu 
Fazlti, 1980 No. l, p. 12. 
ll7. "Speeding the work of Lawmaking," Beijing Re~iew, Vol. 22, No. 9 (March 2, 
1979), p. 3. 
118. See Leng, supra note 16, p. 55. 
119. See the Report of the Chief Procurator Huang Huoqing to the Third Session of 
the Fifth National People's Congress, September 2, 1980. He observed that the "social 
order was not stable and number of crimes has increased." He also said that between 
January and June of 1980, more than 84,000 criminal offenders were prosecuted and 
among them more than 50% were serious current criminal elements. Renmin Ribao, Sep-
tember 17, 1980, p. l. 
120. See, e.g., Bradley K. Martin, "Disturbances are noted in Peking," The Sun (Balti-
more), April 14, 1981, p. A2. 
121. It is reported by various sources that China has at least 20 million unemployed in 
an urban population of about 200 million. See Fox Butterfield, "The Pragmatists Take 
China's Helm," The New York Times Mazagine, December 28, 1980, p. 22. 
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measures, such as placing a city under military control, rather than 
solving such problems through regular legal process. 
Assuming the PRC may be able to overcome the above-stated 
difficulties in establishing a socialist legal system based on its recent 
reforms, the resulting legal system, even by Soviet standards, would 
be far from reasonable and satisfactory. A reasonably operated so-
cialist legal system should reduce the number of political prisoners to 
a tolerable degree. In the Stalinist period, there were several million 
political prisoners in the Soviet Union; that number has since been 
reduced to about ten thousand today. 122 Despite the recent PRC ef-
fort to create a fair legal system and to prevent a renewal of the 
arbitrary persecution of the Cultural Revolution period, the PRC 
still operates a vast network of labor reform camps populated by 
hundreds of thousands of prisoners, a substantial number of whom 
are undoubtedly political prisoners. PRC officials and legal publica-
tions refuse to discuss the labor camps problem. The miserable con-
ditions of the labor camps were vividly described by Bao Ruewang 
in his Prisoner of Mao ,12 To date, there is no evidence that the PRC 
has any intention to make any significant reform of the Chinese Gu-
lags. In 1979, the PRC republished its old rules about labor reform, 
and the Guangming (Enlightenment) Daily even praised the success 
of the labor camp system. 124 · 
Finally, thirty years of political uncertainty and policy shifts 
have instilled a sense of cynicism in the people of the PRC about the 
durability of the current regime's commitment to the rule of law. 
Many Chinese understandably often wonder whether the pendulum 
of Chinese politics may again swing, as in times past, to the left, 
bending the law to the political wind and to the dictates of a major 
mass campaign. Be that as it may, it would be incorrect to view the 
PRC's effort to reform the legal system as insignificant. The PRC, 
having endorsed and publicized a fairly detailed description of its 
effort to reform the legal system as revealed in its recent legislations, 
has put itself in a position where it has a political stake in the general 
implementation of legal reform. Therefore, one might expect some 
modest progress rather than some retrenchment, in China's legal 
reform. 
122. PriSoners of Conscience in the l/SSR: Tlzeir Treatment and Conditions, London: 
Amnesty International, 1975, p. 53. 
123. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1973; Penguin Books edition, 
1976. See also Amnesty International Report, supra note 19, pp. 105-131. 
124. See Fox Butterfield, "Hundreds of Thousands Toil in Chinese Labor Camps," 
Tlte New York Times, January 3, 1981, pp. I, 4. 
SociALIST LEGALISM 
APPENDIX 
CHINESE LANGUAGE ARTICLES/BOOKS CITED 
IN THIS PAPER (IN CHINESE 
CHARACTERS) 
Articles 
~t..-t~fffo_ FAXUE YANJIU 
33 
1978 ;;\11J 1J;rJ.t.. ~~i~:t.~A~;i,!?J'ft~{Jl]"fi-tf,;fL 
21-25 
1979 1£3!{R ~~ t ulj A_ ~~!,ftl~pHy/j ~.B~li\f! 
29-32 
1 s- 'tJi j1liJ 4-l t1 5J -il~ ~~ 'f ~9 1ut r~ ~ 
1-8 
198o J d 111 3-lX:. f-3~ A:i; J.. ~-1~ =.i yt ~g 4'1J ~ 
1981 
27-28, 22 
55_57 ~il f.*~ dl L-if ~ lz. ~ 11 it ;t{t~ tli-fZ ~ }Jo 5* ~l 'r,- :Ji. ~ ~ ~jj :t_tJk. '6 
;{,3t;J 5~.}~~ ''-£ $¥i'l'J!f. !i!~ ~~l}fJ 
30-33 
~4-~~ f{f,-J6t ~ *ttt~JJy~~lti<.it'Wft~Wj 
34-36 
'ls-~ ~~X. ~ -Nj 1'/, }t $Pi -ffl. 
19-24 
32-43 )~ ii~~ ·d ~W-tdrtfi.Wjo9 1L:*· ~ ,·J; 
z,~ ~ Xd£ i:f ''LJfJdt'')i.P~djtf~11:\Jli4] 
23-25 
~ _;l !j 1'~ {t~ MINZHU YU F AZHI 
~ w ..l= 'IJ ""-'• "31! .:E - ' ~ W '' ~ r r.l? ...) -i 1979 ;p 1 r.n --.J :::.., nx "-' -+tr-J-1...-<J~ '~f' -J ~( :q -:q- ,, f!, )) 
36-39 
34 CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES SERIES 
\!fJ .fJ ir.i1'4 ~ ~t ~Jft XINAN ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO 
1979 'l 1 .fJJ iJifJI.t_,'ijfJI!Jjt,J,$•J'J.! M.-iJ,'$_$_ ~';fj f.liJ;:Lf'f~tf 
26-Jo A~9r'-J;U 
1979 '#.2-~ ~~~ i~t~'J,~~~Ij\~;t'N;~4) 
59 
~b 1. it BElliNG ZHICHUN 
1979 'l-itH ~ ~1/ A. ~~HltJL -!l\i.~fJ-d: f.,t:xf.JJa 
12-19 
Books 
1f'J ~ ~~~ ~ili:t-4;#~ Y't ~~~.?~1i.Wr -H•),'l,Zf~ ~ fix-NP ~ 
"$ ••I J...l11if JIU-i.. I 1979 
~.f4'~*""~;t~l~i4~1XM~i ~JZ~ ;tpJt.- ~!-~ 
\t~ ~~~l"t.ff~ ,·~.tu1ll: 
~ ~1h~J.l1i'rf:M- ~~ zAtli~ -:J~;:f.-w.l~~ Jlt .;t, ~ftMh(t(l 
-:11: ~ ~ lt A ~ Jf4_j-i. , 1979 
jf,~i~IJ;yJo]Jf- 1i f£ ix VB3~ ;4) ~\t Ad.lt- 3l(t~J.i 
~t :f, tAJIU.t. 
;~,~t4~~>iK~ijU JK~!l ~oksL :Jt:f.~-4-i!l-Hlffi:~Qt. 198o 
;' J/~ i-ol ~ J: ~ # f/ ftf ~lj-t . 1980 
itVl-~;e ffiJ rr~i-~.4t ~-~ ~~t: +~-'1f*¥(ftt-?t~~t:r. 1980 
SOCIALIST LEGALISM 
r( :f. .a ,,~ ~ j MINZHU YU F AZHI 
1979 ft dhl ;j -it JI~ "t.J-JJ:4.tl 4, J ~~" 
'~ ~:t1 :t~ ~ ~· ~. u.~~ i!! ff.~a9 *~ 
1-4 
19-20 JiJi~ AJ.~ ~ 1~ §,1 
36 7j ~-!f ;iJ ,ff"j,j~ ~-t~ ~i ·}if.' 
39 ~~~ ~l..&..14nti3 .' 
1980 t I~ .#f'Hf~ f~~-fi,J!.f,~#-!1..~ 
11-12 
22-24 
25 
~loin *{7~ ;~/frlJJU J...) .. Jj:lfi]~;},~ftpi. 
2-3 
11
"
12 -I;~ i~, tJ..Itffl1~,'1; lf:Jill~ ~fd~~~~~ 
38 .!1 <t ~ 1" ~!J </;~ 7]\o ..r ;·3f fl:iPJ 
f l/i~ f,f.{piq \~ ~ 15-t~#l 
10-11 
35 
\~ ~Jir'~,~~~'1.tl, (;J.}~';(t.j) XINAN ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO 
1979 ~ J tJit /11{ f: 1~-t ~..fiJ ~ ., . .;o~"t 
6-9 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
j 
I 
j 
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1977 Series 
No.1- 1977 
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on 
Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp. 
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Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp. 
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and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp. 
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Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index 
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The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison 
with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook 
Hong) 80 pp. 
No.7- 1977•• 
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the 
People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22 
pp. 
No.8- 1977• 
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, With Appended 
Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of 
Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu) 67 pp. 
No.9- 1977 
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by 
Wai-lim Yip) 126 pp. 
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Legal Aspects of U .8. Republic of China Trade and Investment -
Proceedings of A Regional Conference of the American Society of 
International Law (Edited by Hungdab Chiu and David 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
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$ 1.00 
$ 1.00 
$ 3.00· 
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Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P. 
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Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China; 
Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, 
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Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung 
$ 1.00 
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of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan·li Wu and Kung-chia 
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No. 4 - 1978 (18) 
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in 
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The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting 
Mao Tee-Tung's Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp. $ 1.00 
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Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some 
Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp. $ 1.00 
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A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and 
Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp. $ 2.00 
Occasional Papers/ Reprints Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
1978 Series 
No. 8 - 1978 (20) 
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities 
and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp. 
No. 9 - 1978 (21) 
Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82 
pp. Index 
1979 Series 
No. 1 - 1979 (22) 
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah 
$ 2.00 
$ 2.00 
Chiu) 54 pp. $ 2.00 
No. 2 - 1979 (23) 
Social Disorder In Peking After The 1976 Earthquake Revealed By A 
Chinese Legal Document (By Hungdah Chiu) 20 pp. $ 2.00 
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The Dragon and the Eagle - A Study of U.S.·People's Republic of 
China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65 pp. $ 3.00 
No. 4 - 1979 (215) 
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai·lim Yip and William 
Tay) 108 pp. 
No. 15 - 1979 (26)* 
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China 
$ 3.00 
(Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp. $ 2.00 
No. 8 - 1979 (27) 
China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage 
Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index $ 3.00 
No. 7 - 1979 (28) 
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies 
(Charles cochran and Hungdah Chiu) 130 pp. Index $ 2.50 
No. 8 - 1979 (29) 
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Cooper) 45 pp. $ 2.00 
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series 
in Contemporary Asian Studies 
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No. 1 - 1980 (30) 
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu) 
200 pp. Index 
No. 2 - 1980 (31) 
The Conceptual Foundations of U.S. China Policy: A Critical Review 
(James C. Hsiung) 17 pp. 
No. 3 - 1980 (32) 
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. 
Strategies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan) 61 pp. 
No. 4 - 1980 (33) 
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and 
American Constitutional Law (Jyh·pin Fa) 200 pp. Index 
No. 5 - 1980 (34)* 
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China 
(Hungdah Chiu) 34 pp. 
No. 6- 1980 (35)* 
China's New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu) 16 
pp. 
No. 7 - 1980 (36) 
China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan & 
Ka-che Yip) 115 pp. 
No. 8- 1980 (37) 
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies (1979· 
1980) (Edited by John F. Cooper) 45 pp. 
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. Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's 
Criminal Justice System• (Hungdah Chiu) 31 pp. 
No. 2 - 1981 (39) 
Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. 
Prybyla) 58 pp. 
No. 3 - 1981 (40) 
Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China 
(Edited by James C. Hsiung) 118 pp. 
No. 4 - 1981 (41)* 
China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah Chiu) 30 pp. 
No. 5 - 1981 (42) 
China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (John Franklin Copper) 54 pp. 
No. 8 - 1981 (43) 
Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael) 27 pp. 
No. 7 - 1981 (44) ISBN 0-942182-43-X 
Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Parris H. Chang) 43 pp. 
No. 8 - 1981 (45) ISBN 0-942182-44-X 
Multi-system Nations and International Law - The International 
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Conference of American Society of International Law) (Edited by 
Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen) ::loa pp. Index. 
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$ 2.00 
$ 2.00 
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Liu) 57 pp. $3.00 
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